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Abstract
                                                
 
 
An essential point to arise out of macroeconomic literature of the last twenty years is 
that imperfect competition in product markets allows scope for aggregate demand to 
affect the level of output and employment; and to have positive impacts on “welfare”. 
The present paper considers the connection between “imperfect competition” and 
macroeconomic outcomes from a Sraffian perspective. In this case, the appropriate 
categorisation is one of restricted versus unrestricted competition: essentially the 
ability of intersectoral capital mobility to enforce a uniform rate of profit. The paper 
also considers the significance of product differentiation, which is generally assumed 
to be the defining characteristic of imperfectly competitive markets. A Sraffian 
approach makes clear the limited significance of the concept product differentiation in 
a multi-commodity framework particularly in drawing hard and fast implications 
about “welfare”. The investigation of connections between restricted competition and 
macro outcomes therefore turns largely on the significance of restrictions on mobility 
for output and employment multipliers.  
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COMPETITION, “WELFARE” AND MACROECONOMICS – A 
CLASSICAL/SRAFFIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
I Introduction 
 
A key point to arise out of the macroeconomics literature of the last twenty five years 
is that imperfect competition when combined with rigidities in prices provides scope 
for aggregate demand shocks to impact on output and employment (e.g. Mankiw, 
1988; Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987, Dixon and Rankin, 1994). This has been 
heralded (e.g. Mankiw, 1990) by the so-called ‘New Keynesians’ as the definitive 
modern theoretical foundation for the Keynesian premise that output and employment 
can be constrained by aggregate demand and in turn that there is scope for demand 
management policy to impact on output and employment, albeit in the short-run.1 
 
Of course, the relegation of the influence of aggregate demand to a short-run world of 
sluggish prices is merely the flipside of the notion that a competitive capitalist 
economy necessarily tends to full-employment of all factors, including labour. More 
significantly, on the basis of the capital-theoretic critique of the 1960’s, the latter 
notion has been well and truly shattered (although, as is patently obvious, 
conventional macroeconomics still clings to this discredited notion). The 
classical/Sraffian critique of the orthodox macroeconomics (Garegnani, 1978; Eatwell 
and Milgate, 1983; see also White, 2004) dismisses any hard and fast relation between 
competitive equilibrium in a capitalist economy and full-employment. In this critique 
‘competitive’ refers to the old classical notion of ‘free competition’ (Kurz and 
Salvadori, 1995, Ch. 1), consistent with a uniform rate of profit across sectors. And 
this notion of competition is quite consistent with prices at any point in time being 
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influenced by discrepancies between demands and supplies (though this influence 
does not entail equilibrium prices being determined by forces of demand and supply). 
 
Yet the classical/Sraffian critique of orthodox macroeconomics seems incomplete to 
the extent that it does not take up a significant thread of orthodox reasoning of the last 
three decades; viz., the significance of imperfectly competitive product markets for 
macroeconomic outcomes. The present paper is an attempt to do so: in particular, to 
clarify what a Sraffian response might be to this development in orthodox theory and 
to locate such a response within a more general classical/Sraffian perspective. 
 
In articulating such a response it becomes necessary to spell out precisely how a 
classical/Sraffian perspective would approach the notion of “imperfect competition” 
and what alternative it would provide to the orthodox juxtaposition of perfect and 
imperfect competition. To this end, Section II provides a preliminary sketch of a 
Sraffian perspective on the significance of demand expansion under conditions of 
imperfect competition. Sections III – VI provide a more in-depth consideration of the 
significance of product differentiation in a Sraffian framework; including its 
“welfare” implications. Sections VII - IX consider the case of “restricted competition” 
(as an alternative to imperfect competition), the distinguishing feature being the 
existence of persistent profit rate differentials (other than on the basis of risk and 
illiquidity) between sectors. A simple multi-commodity model with profit rate 
differentials is used to the relation between the size and pattern of profit rate 
differentials and output and employment multipliers; as a means of shedding light on 
the claim that expenditure multipliers increase with the degree of product market 
imperfection. Section X provides some brief concluding notes. 
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 II Imperfect competition, macroeconomics and the Sraffian alternative – some 
 preliminary observations 
 
Consider a multi-commodity, multi-industry model with monopolistic competition 
within each industry. In the absence of price rigidities, with downward-sloping 
demand curves facing individual producers, an expansion of aggregate demand would 
shift up marginal revenue curves for each firm. Profit maximization would then entail 
a rise in output price as firms move up their marginal cost curves. However, in a 
generalized input-output system (or as an orthodox theorist might put it, in a general 
equilibrium setting) all firms must suffer a rise in their cost schedules as the prices of 
produced inputs rise. This must negate some of the initial impact on output. But as 
cost functions shift up this generates a further fall in output and rise in price producing 
yet further shifts in firms’ cost functions.  
 
If one adds into this the notion of an aggregate demand function monotonically 
decreasing in the general price level, it is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that 
eventually prices will rise sufficiently to negate the original increase in aggregate 
demand; so that we arrive eventually back at the original level of output.  
 
The moral of this simple story is twofold: first, that imperfect competition in product 
markets and thus pricing above marginal cost, by itself, is insufficient to guarantee 
that a rise in aggregate demand will lead to a persistent increase in output (Dixon and 
Rankin, (1994, p. 178)) – there must also be some stickiness in prices; second (though 
this is really just another way of looking at the first moral), since, from an orthodox 
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point of view, prices are higher under monopolistic competition vis a vis perfect 
competition, and given the decreasing aggregate demand function, aggregate output 
and, conceivably employment, must be lower under the imperfectly competitive case. 
However, to move to the competitive full-employment equilibrium, requires more 
than just an expansion of aggregate demand, it requires stickiness in prices. 
 
So what would be the Sraffian response to this? In a Sraffian approach, as demand 
increases, with flexible prices, there could be no increase in long-period prices unless 
the increase in demand alters technical conditions or the rate of interest (supposing 
that the rate of profit is exogenously determined by the rate of interest and the latter in 
turn by the monetary authorities).  
 
But what of short-period prices? If the market is prepared to bear a higher price for 
some commodities, then there may be an increase in profit rates in some industries – 
giving rise to short-run profit rate differentials. Yet arguably in the longer term, in the 
absence of barriers to entry, these differentials are eliminated by competition, as is the 
long-run result under conditions of monopolistic competition. Prices would return to 
their long-period levels. 
 
Thus, the first reaction from someone taking a Sraffian perspective – who of course 
would reject the notion of a monotonically decreasing aggregate demand function and 
who will for the same reason suppose that regardless of the degree of product market 
imperfection, the system will not be at full-employment either in the short-run or 
long-run2 - is that the effect of the aggregate demand expansion is to increase output 
in the long-run and possibly in the short-run as well; and to increase prices possibly in 
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the short-run, but not in the long-run.3 In this case, any price rises associated with the 
expansion in aggregate demand become temporary – and the output changes 
permanent – the reverse of traditional orthodoxy. For the purposes of whether or not 
there are positive output changes, the issue of stickiness of prices is essentially 
irrelevant. 
 
But is it possible to say something more definite about these matters from a Sraffian 
perspective? Two points are worth making in this regard. The first concerns the 
meaning of “imperfect competition”, from a Sraffian perspective.  In the present paper 
we will consider the relevant aspect in defining degrees of competition to be the 
extent to which capital is free to move in seeking its highest rate of return. As such, 
the relevant comparison is between “free or unrestricted competition” on the one 
hand, where ultimately mobility of capital will generate a uniform rate of profit across 
production processes, and, on the other hand, “restricted competition” where 
restrictions on the mobility of capital allow differentials in profit rate (in the absence 
of risk and illiquidity) to persist and/or a higher average rate of profit across sectors 
compared with the absence of such restrictions. Hence the question of the significance 
of the degree of competition for macroeconomic outcomes, specifically, output and 
employment, can be approach by considering the significance of profit rate 
differentials and or higher than “normal” profit rates for aggregate output. 
 
The second point relates back to the significance of imperfect competition for macro 
outcomes, at least from an orthodox view; and this has largely to do with the 
implications for the price level and for the profitability of expanding output in 
response to a demand expansion. In turn, this reflects a key defining aspect of 
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imperfect competition within orthodox theory – product differentiation. So it seems 
useful to reflect to some extent on the meaning and significance of product 
differentiation, from a Sraffian  perspective.  And this we turn to first.  
 
 
III Product differentiation in a classical/Sraffian model (I) 
 
One could start by thinking of product differentiation as having two aspects: first, it 
entails the appearance of additional production processes corresponding to the 
differentiated products and as a consequence additional prices4. Second, demand for 
what in the absence of such differentiation would have been one commodity is now 
split between a number of commodities. 
 
With regard to the first aspect, a useful question to begin with is whether product 
differentiation could apply to all commodities, viz., to both basics and non-basics in 
the Sraffian sense? Alternatively put, could one conceive of a Sraffian case, with 
prices at their long-period equilibrium values, where every commodity has at least one 
other substitutable competitor product? 
 
Some simple reflections would suggest that such could not be the case. Consider a 
system producing two types of commodities – a pure consumption good which does 
not enter directly as an input into the production of either commodity and a capital 
good required as input in the production of the consumption good as well as in its own 
production. If we suppose that at most there are only two “varieties” of the consumer 
good and capital good, there are then three possible cases: 
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(i) Two products produced by the consumer good ‘industry’ use different 
circulating capital inputs – each circulating capital good process uses its 
own circulating capital good as input.  
 
(ii) Two products produced by the consumer good ‘industry’ use the same 
circulating capital input.   
 
(iii) One product produced by the consumer good industry but two different 
circulating capital goods being produced, each of which could be used in 
combination with labour to produce the consumption good. 
 
The third case can be fairly easily ruled out. With only one consumption good, only 
one of the circulating capital goods will be in used in production. Hence only one 
circulating capital good is in demand from the consumption sector. Put another way, 
for case (iii) to persist, one must also suppose that some production processes in the 
consumption good “industry” use one type of circulating capital good and some use 
the other circulating capital good. With a uniform rate of profit, the relative price 
associated with the output of each production process in the consumption good 
“industry” must be different; this difference of course reflecting what are in fact two 
different commodities, this in turn reflecting the use of different capital inputs.5 
Product differentiation in the circulating capital goods “industry” cannot therefore co-
exist with a homogeneous product in the consumption good “industry”.6  
 
However this reasoning should not apply in reverse, since, with a pure consumption 
good, the commodities produced in the consumption good industry do not enter as 
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inputs either directly or indirectly into any production process. It thus appears possible 
for product differentiation in the pure consumption good, with a homogeneous 
circulating capital good, i.e. case (ii) above. 
 
But what of case (i), i.e.  product differentiation for circulating capital as well as for 
the consumption good "industry", so that it is possible to produce each consumption 
good using a different circulating capital input? This case is more complex, although 
it does seem possible to say that, for any given price system, there must be at least one 
undifferentiated “basic” commodity. However, before reflecting further on this case 
and its complexities, it is useful to try and formalize the key points of the discussion 
so far. 
  
IV Product differentiation in a classical/Sraffian model (II) 
 
We consider in effect firstly case (ii) of the previous section and then case (i). For 
case (ii) we have in effect a three-commodity model; with a prices system such as that 
below. 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
. . .
. . .
. . .
a c1 m c1 c1
a c2 m c2 c2
a a m a a
p a 1 r w l p
p a 1 r w l p
p a 1 r w l p
+ + =
+ + =
+ + =
    ……..(1.) 
 
where pa refers to the price of the capital good, pc1 and pc2 to the prices of the two 
different varieties of the consumption good, 1 and 2, wm the uniform money wage 
rate, r the uniform rate of profit ai and li the unit capital and labour requirements 
respectively in the production of commodity i. 
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 Suppose that the technologies of the production processes for the consumption goods 
are related as follows 
 
.
.
c2 c c1
c2 l c1
a a
l l
α
α
=
=       ……..(2.) 
in which case, price equations (1) can be written as  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
. . .
. . . . .
. . .
a c1 m c1 c1
a c c1 m l c1 c2
a a m a a
p a 1 r w l p
p a 1 r w l p
p a 1 r w l p
α α
+ + =
+ + =
+ + =
   ……..(3.) 
 
Taking the money wage as numeraire, one can solve for prices relative to the money 
wage as functions of technology and the rate of profit, so that  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
. .
. . . .
. .
aw c1 c1 c1w
aw c c1 l c1 c2w
aw a a aw
p a 1 r l p
p a 1 r l p
p a 1 r l p
α α
+ + =
+ + =
+ + =
      ……..(4.) 
and therefore  
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
c1 a
c1w c1
a
c1 a c
c2w c1 l
a
a
aw
a
a l 1 r
p l
1 a 1 r
a l 1 r
p l
1 a 1 r
lp
1 a 1 r
αα
+= + − +
+= + − +
= − +
    ……..(5.) 
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The price of the basic (i.e. circulating capital) commodity is of course unaffected by 
the existence of product differentiation, as is the price of commodity 1, in terms of the 
money wage. Product differentiation, defined here in terms of values of one or both of 
the coefficients αl and αc, being positive and different from unity, impacts of course 
on the relative price of commodities 1 and 2.7 
 
Taking the total differential of the expression for pc2w and assuming a given rate of 
profit and given technical coefficients, except for αl and αc, the difference in price 
between the two consumption commodities can be related to the magnitude of αl and 
αc, in the following way 
 
( )
( )
. . .
.
.
c1 a c
c1 l
a
a l 1 r d
l d
1 a 1 r
αα ++ − +     ……..(6.) 
 
where dαl and dαc refer to the difference in labour and circulating capital requirements 
associated with producing the differentiated commodity.  Clearly, whether the 
differentiated commodity has a higher or lower price than its competitive product 
depends on the signs of  dαl and dαc and their magnitude. It should be added here that, 
since product differentiation makes no difference to the basic commodity’s price, the 
absence of product differentiation could not affect the price of commodity 1, at least 
in a long-period setting.8  
 
V Product differentiation and “basic” commodities 
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Turning now to case (i) of section III above, suppose there exists a differentiated 
circulating capital good, where each ‘version’ is produced by means of itself and 
labour and the proportions in which it is combined with labour in its own production 
are different between the two versions of this good. Suppose also that the producers of 
one of the versions of the consumer good seek to differentiate their commodity from 
the other version of the consumer good (at least partly) by reference to the particular 
circulating capital good used in its production. Thus each of the “varieties” of the 
circulating capital good must be utilized in the production of consumer goods. 
 
We also suppose here that in differentiating their commodity producers of the 
consumer good use inputs in a different proportion to those of their competitors. In 
other words we assume that the process of differentiating their product requires 
possibly additional amounts of the inputs (not all in the same proportion) or at the 
very least a different combination of existing inputs; so that, for the two sector case 
considered here 
 
c1 c2
c1 c2
a a
l l
≠   . 
  
We would then appear to be left with two separate price systems:  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
. . .
. . .
a1 c1 m c1 c1
a1 1a m a1 a1
p a 1 r w l p
p a 1 r w l p
+ + =
+ + =     ……..(7.) 
and  
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
. . .
. . .
a2 c2 m c2 c2
a2 2a m a2 a2
p a 1 r w l p
p a 1 r w l p
+ + =
+ + =     ……..(8.) 
Taking the money wage as numeraire, we have 2 distinct real wage (in terms of the 
consumption good) – rate of profit relations:  
 
( )
( ) ( )
.
. . . .
1a
c1w c1 a1 c1 1a
1 a 1 r1
p a l 1 r l 1 a 1 r
− += + + − +⎡⎣ ⎤⎦    
……..(9.) 
( )
( ) ( )
.
. . . .
2a
c2w c2 a2 c2 2a
1 a 1 r1
p a l 1 r l 1 a 1 r
− += + + − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
A number of remarks are warranted in regard to this case. First, the continued 
existence of a differentiated circulating capital input alongside the differentiated 
consumption good would seem to require that some producers of the consumer good 
see a benefit from the use of a particular circulating capital good. They must perceive 
that the distinctive quality of a particular variety of the differentiated consumption 
good is attributable in part at least to the use of a particular circulating capital input 
and/or that the use of a particular variety of circulating capital as input is integral to 
establishing some “brand loyalty” for their consumer good.  
 
Put another way, the essence of what it is that allows the consumer good producer to 
differentiate his/her output must be seen, by that producer, as being tied necessarily to 
the use of a particular type of circulating capital input. For as soon as producers of the 
differentiated consumer good perceive that they can successfully differentiate their 
output independently of whichever of the two circulating capital goods is used, then, 
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presumably, the cheapest process for producing the circulating capital good is chosen. 
One of the methods for producing the circulating capital good disappears and with it 
the corresponding price system. In this case, the two price systems (7) and (8) would 
collapse to the case of price system (3). Product differentiation would therefore be 
limited to the consumption  industry producing goods which are not required as inputs 
into production: in a long-period setting there would exist only one circulating capital 
good for producing the differentiated consumption goods.9   
 
Supposing then that this condition – that the essence of differentiation in the consumer 
good is tied to differentiation in the circulating capital good – is fulfilled, we have two 
price systems co-existing side by side. 10 
 
Of course, the question arises as to the significance of the case where different price 
systems co-exist; were there to exist one or more “undifferentiated basics” in the 
economy; namely one or more commodities used as input either directly or indirectly 
in the production of all commodities? In this case there should be only one price 
system. Price systems (7) and (8) would therefore take the role of non-basic sub-
systems within the overall single price system. Hence to avoid the scenario of more 
than one price system, one would simply have to assume at least one basic (in the 
Sraffian sense) commodity.11  
 
VI “Welfare” and product differentiation 
 
Having established how product differentiation could be considered in a 
classical/Sraffian framework, it is useful to try to draw out what that framework 
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would suggest by way of the “welfare” implications of product differentiation. This is 
appropriate particularly in view of the orthodox claim of an aggregate demand 
externality associated with imperfect competition. Thus, for Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987), “[t]he equilibrium level of real money balances is lower in the monopolistic 
equilibrium … [and thus under] monopolistic competition, output of monopolistically 
produced is too low … this follows from the existence of monopoly power in price 
and wage setting  ….. it [output being too low] follows from an aggregate demand 
externality” (p.653).  
 
In order to shed further light on the possible “welfare” implications of product 
differentiation, at least for the stationary economy, we proceed in two stages. In the 
first stage, we compare the net output per head in the undifferentiated and 
differentiated product cases; taking net output per head here as a proxy for 
consumption per head.12 For the purposes of this exercise we continue to assume, 
unless otherwise stated, that the appearance of differentiated products does not entail 
higher profit rates than in their absence. The second stage deals with the “welfare” 
implications of restricted competition, which would allow for a higher average rate of 
profit than under unrestricted competition. This second stage is discussed in 
subsequent sections.  
 
For analytical purposes we consider it appropriate to separate these characteristics of 
so-called “imperfect competition”. This view is based on the result established in this 
and following sections that, at least from a Sraffian perspective, the significance of 
“imperfect” competition, for prices and outputs, primarily lies in its implications for 
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profit rates, their level and pattern, rather than in the substitutability of commodities 
for consumers, viz., the degree of product differentiation. 
 
In considering the implications of product differentiation for net output per worker, 
we take in turn the cases outlined so far: differentiation only in the pure consumption 
good; differentiation in both the consumption and circulating capital good.  
 
(i) Welfare and differentiation exclusively in the consumption good 
 
In the case of a stationary economy the net output consists solely of a quantity of the 
consumption good(s). One can think of product differentiation in terms of the 
operation side-by-side of two distinct vertically integrated production systems each  
producing a consumption good via a combination of a quantity of circulating capital 
and labour. For the stationary economy, the net output of each “system” is a quantity 
of the particular consumption good.. As is well known, the net product per worker of 
each system, considered separately, is equal to the maximum real wage (i.e. rate of 
profit is equal to zero) in terms of the relevant consumption good for that system 
(Garegnani, 1970 pp. 408-409) and would, for the case dealt with in section III above, 
be given by  
 
( ). .1 aw c1 a c1 a
1 aNP
a l l 1 a
−= + −    
……..(10.) 
( ). .2 aw c2 a c2 a
1 aNP
a l l 1 a
−= + −  
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Note that, since at this point we are considering the case where the same circulating 
capital good is used to produce the two consumption goods, the ‘a’ and ‘l’ coefficients 
pertaining to the production of circulating capital are identical for the two equations 
above. 
 
With product differentiation, and thus with the imperfectly substitutable commodities 
1 and 2, the “aggregate” net product expressed in terms of commodity 1 is given by  
 
.A1 1 21NP Y p Y= + 2
1w
       ……..(11.) 
 
In equilibrium, the gross outputs of commodities 1 and 2 reflect demands, which, as 
proportions of NP1A are denoted respectively as c1w and c2w, so that  
.A1 1Y NP c=    and   .
A
1 2w
2
21
NP cY
p
=     ……..(12.) 
where 
 
1w 2wc c+ = 1 .       ……..(13.) 
 
The quantity of labour employed in the production of the net products NP1 and NP2 
respectively  
 
.
.
.
A
1 1
1
1w 1w
A
2 1
2
2w 21 2w
Y NP cL
NP NP
Y NP cL
NP p NP
= =
= =
1w
2w
      …….. (14.) 
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 so that 
 
.
1 2 1w 2w
A
1 1w 21
L L c c
NP NP p NP
+ = +
2w
      …….. (15.) 
 
and, in turn, the aggregate net product per worker in the case of product 
differentiation, measured in terms of commodity 1 can be written as 
 
. .
. . .
A
A1 1w 21
1w
1 2 1w 21 2w 2w 1w
NP NP p NPNP
L L c p NP c NP
= =+ +
2w        ……..(16.)13  
 
Supposing that “initially” there is no product differentiation and that the only 
consumption good is commodity 1, for net product per worker in terms of commodity 
1 to be reduced with the appearance of product differentiation  
. .
. . .
A 1w 21 2w
1w 1w
1w 21 2w 2w 1w
NP p NPNP NP
c p NP c NP
= <+        ……..(17.) 
 
More significantly, one can write inequality (17) in a form which shows that the 
variation of aggregate net product per worker as a result of product differentiation 
turns on the variation of the relative price of the differentiated consumption goods as 
the rate of profit changes. In particular, in order that the appearance of a differentiated 
product reduce net product per worker, it is necessary for  
 
. . . .21 2w 1w 21 2w 2w 1wp NP c p NP c NP− <      ……..(18.) 
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 and thus, in view of equation (13), for 
1w
21
2w
NPp
NP
<          ……..(19.) 
 
Since the net product per worker for each system is the maximum real wage in terms 
of the relevant consumption good, and thus the value of the real wage where the rate 
of profit is zero, then the above condition becomes  
 r 021 21p p
=<           ……..(20.) 
 
where r 021p
=  represents the relative price of the two consumption goods where the rate 
of profit is equal to zero. Hence the behaviour of the relative price of the 
differentiated consumption goods as the rate of profit increases above zero is 
indicative of the implication of product differentiation, as it is defined here, for net 
product per worker. 
 
In the simplest case where there is no differentiation in the circulating capital good, 
the relative price p21 can be derived on the basis of equations (9) (which shows the 
real wage expressed in terms of the two commodities); differentiating p21 with respect 
to the rate of profit and recalling equations (2),  
( )
( ) ( )( )2a1ca1c
lc1ca1c21
r1.a1.lr1.l.a
.l.l.a
dr
dp
+−++
−= αα         …….. (21.) 
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Hence, the direction of change in p21 with a change in the rate of profit and hence the 
change in the net product per worker as a result of the appearance of product 
differentiation in the form of commodity 2, turns on how the technical conditions of 
production compare between the two “differentiated product processes”; specifically, 
the magnitude (αc – αl). 
 
In other words, if for this simplest case, (αc – αl) > 0, the differential (21) is positive, 
condition (20) then does not hold and the net product per worker in terms of 
commodity 1 rises rather than falls with product differentiation. Interestingly, this way 
of considering the implications of product differentiation for output per worker also 
suggests that, even where one brings into consideration the prospect of a higher 
general rate of profit (as a manifestation of the “imperfection” of competition) 
accompanying product differentiation, the possibility exists that net product per 
worker (in terms of the commodity present prior to product differentiation) increases. 
Note also that this result is completely independent of the relative size of the activity 
levels of the processes producing commodities 1 and 2, i.e. independent of c1w and 
c2w: assuming  c1w and c2w are < 1, the implication of product differentiation for the 
size of the net product depends exclusively on the movement of 21p  with the rate of 
profit.14 
(ii) Welfare and differentiation of commodity inputs 
 
For the case where product differentiation involves differentiation in circulating 
capital inputs, the movement in the relative price of the differentiated consumer good 
and thus the implications for net output per worker are more complex. But simple 
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reflection makes clear that one can be no more definite about the welfare implications 
of product differentiation in this case than in the simple case above.  
 
In effect, one can split the case where product differentiation involves product 
differentiation of inputs into two possibilities: the first involves no difference in the 
method (combination of labour and other inputs) in the production of consumer 
goods. This case, where differentiation arises from the use in production of 
differentiated inputs – i.e the use alongside labour of a different circulating capital 
good in the production of the differentiated consumer goods -  is analogous to a 
standard choice of technique problem in classical/Sraffian analysis. Mathematically it 
is represented by the co-existence of the two price systems (7) and (8) but with the 
assumption that c l 1α α= = . 
 
Suppose initially, in the no-product-differentiation case, the technique in use to 
produce a circulating capital good and a consumption good is system 1. We suppose 
that the appearance of a differentiated product takes the form of a consumer good 
produced with a circulating capital good where this circulating capital good is 
produced using a different method (i.e. combination of labour and itself) from the 
initial non-product-differentiated case – system 2. The consumer good produced by 
means of this “different” circulating capital good, will itself be “different” from the 
consumer good of the non-product-differentiated case, although we assume that the 
combination of labour and circulating capital to produce the consumption good is 
identical for the two techniques. Thus the “method of production” differs only in the 
production of circulating capital between the two techniques.   
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Product differentiation in this case amounts to the co-existence of two different 
techniques, 1 and the new technique 2 and can be illustrated as in Figure 1. The figure 
consists of two wage-rate of profit relations representing the two different price 
systems associated with the use of the different circulating capital input. As noted 
above, net product for each system will be indicated by the maximum real wage for 
that system. Product differentiation as noted above will entail both systems being used 
simultaneously, so that net product per worker, measured in terms of one of the 
consumption commodities will be given by equations (16) above and will depend not 
only on the net product per worker for each price system, considered in isolation, but 
also on the relative price of the differentiated consumer goods. 
 
Figure 1  
 
NPw1 
1 2 
r*r1 r2 r
NPw2 
w
As is also well known, for the present case there is can be only one “switch-point” at 
which prices of the corresponding commodities are identical between the two 
techniques – in the diagram, this is at r = r*. For the case depicted in the diagram it 
follows that for r1 < r*, the price of commodity 1 will be lower than that of 
commodity 2 because the price of the circulating capital good produced by technique 
1 will be lower and conversely for r2 > r*.15 It follows that p21 falls monotonically as 
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the rate of profit rises so that condition (21) above is fulfilled and thus net product per 
worker expressed in terms of commodity 1 is lower with the appearance of a 
differentiated product.  
 
However, supposing that the wage-profit curves were the reverse of those in the 
diagram so that for r1 < r*, the price of commodity 1 was higher than that of 
commodity 2 and conversely for r2 > r*, then p21 would be rising with the rate of 
profit and net product per worker in terms of commodity 1 would be rising with the 
appearance of a differentiated product. 
 
But what of the case with a different combination of labour and circulating capital 
used in the production of the two consumer goods; i.e. different methods in the 
production of both consumer and circulating capital goods. Effectively, this is a 
combination of the previous two cases and the best way to deal with this is to consider 
the analogous version of condition (21). In other words, we consider the conditions 
under which the relative price of the differentiated consumer goods changes with a 
change in the rate of profit. The relative price of the differentiated consumer goods in 
this case can be derived from the price systems (9); bearing in mind equations (2) and 
supposing analogously for the production of the differentiated circulating capital 
goods that  
.
.
2a a 1a
a2 la a1
a a
l l
α
α
=
=   ….. (22.)  
so that 
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α
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 ……..(23.) 
Differentiating (23) with respect to the rate of profit, r, and after some manipulation, it 
is possible to show that the direction of change in the relative price pc21 in response to 
a change in the rate of profit, turns on whether the term  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
. . . .
              . . . . . . . . . . .
c1 c1 c a2w l a1w
a2w a1w
c c1 c1 c1 a1w c1 c1 l c1 c a2w
a l p p
dp dp1 r a l a 1 r p a l a 1 r p
dr dr
α α
α α
− +
⎛ ⎞+ + + − + +α⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎜ ⎟⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎝ ⎠⎦
         ……..(24.) 
is positive or negative. As this indicates, and as is well known (Pasinetti, 1977  and 
Bidard ,1998), the direction of change of relative prices in response to a rise in the 
rate of profit, in the vicinity of a particular rate of profit is complex even within the 
one price system). But in the case under consideration, two prices systems exist side-
by side, arguably complicating the analysis of relative price changes even further.  
 
However, the analysis of previous cases allows one to give some intuitive 
interpretation in respect of expression (above). The first parenthetical term in 
expression (24) – which is analogous to what Pasinetti elsewhere refers to as the 
“capital-intensity effect” (op.cit.,  pp.82-83) – shows that for given prices of the 
circulating capital goods used in production of the differentiated consumption goods, 
the impact of a rise in the rate of profit on the relative price pc21 is obviously partly 
influenced by the relative size of αc and αl. This is clearly the import of the case (i) 
above. The second major parenthetical term in expression (24) is more complex and 
reflects the impact of changes in the rate of profit on the prices of the two circulating 
capital goods which are used respectively in the production of the differentiated 
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consumer goods. As is also evident, from expression (24), the sign of this second 
parenthetical term is clearly dependent on the particular level of the rate of profit.  
  
Thus, in considering the impact of product differentiation on net product per worker, 
where product differentiation involves a different method of production of the 
consumer good but also a different method of producing the circulating capital good, 
and focusing on the condition (20) one might consider the particular rate of profit 
relevant for expression (24) to be zero. In the vicinity of this rate of profit, and 
considering Figure 1, where ac and al are effectively both equal to unity, expression 
(24) would simplify somewhat to   
. . . . . .a2w a1w a2w a1wc1 c1 c1 c1 a1w c1 c1 a2w
dp dp dp dpa l a l p a l
dr dr dr dr
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + − − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭p
 
……..(25.) 
As discussed above, in this case, pc21 would be falling with an increase in the rate of 
profit. Expression (25) in other words would be negative, since (looking again at 
Figure 1), pa2w > pa1w, but a2w a1w
dp dp
dr dr
< .  
 
But with a different method of production for the differentiated consumer goods and 
thus either or both of αc and αl   ≠ 1, then expression (25) will instead be  
 
. . . . . . . . . . .a2w a1w a2w a1wc1 c l c1 c c1 c1 l a1w c1 c c1 c a2w
dp dp dp dpa l a l p a l
dr dr dr dr
α α α α α α⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛− + − − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎩ ⎭p
⎞⎟⎠
         ……..(26.) 
In other words the direction of change in pc21 as the rate profit rises above zero, will 
depend on the sign of expression (26). If, as in the case of Figure 1, pa2w > pa1w and 
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a2w a1wdp dp
dr dr
< , this no longer guarantees that the sign of the expression  is negative. 
The sign also comes to depend, as noted above, on how αc compares with αl , and thus 
on difference in combination of labour and circulating capital in the production of the 
differentiated consumer goods. Thus for example if αc is sufficiently large compared 
with αl  (so that the production of consumer good 1 uses a higher ratio of circulating 
capital to labour), this would counterbalance the effect of pa2w > pa1w and 
a2w a1wdp dp
dr dr
<  on pc21 as the rate of profit rises, so that theoretically, pc21 rises with r 
rather than falls. 
 
More significantly, in this last case, with product differentiation involving different 
methods in the production of both circulating capital and the consumer good, there is 
similarly nothing definite to be said a priori regarding the direction of change in net 
product per worker as a result of the appearance of differentiated products. Moreover, 
as noted earlier, this result appears also to hold even where the product differentiation 
is accompanied by a rise in the rate of profit. 
 
VII Restricted competition, profit rates and aggregate output and employment 
 
This analysis so far would seem to give part of a classical/Sraffian answer to the 
orthodox claim that imperfect competition is associated with a “welfare loss”: even if 
we suppose that the rate of profit is higher in the case with product differentiation, 
there is no guarantee that consumption per worker (measured as net product per 
worker in terms of one of the consumer goods), in the stationary state case, would be 
lower.  
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 Of course, this does not settle the issue of a “welfare loss”. Although consumption per 
worker may not be lower, “welfare” may be judged to be lower, if there is less 
aggregate employment as a result of imperfect or restricted competition. To assess this 
requires one to link the degree of competition with the scale of the economy.  
What would be the effect of changes in the level and pattern of profit rates on output 
or activity levels in each industry? We now attempt a tentative answer to this 
question, but one solely in terms of the effect of changes in the general level of profit 
rates on income-expenditure multipliers; i.e. the multipliers relating gross outputs in 
for each commodity and autonomous expenditures. To further simplify, we consider 
that the only commodity for which there is an autonomous element in its expenditure 
is the circulating capital good.  
 
For the differentiated product case of Section VI (i) previous sections nominal 
demands and gross outputs in equilibrium for the three commodities – commodities 1, 
2 and commodity A – can be expressed as follows:  
 
iii1piim1w11 a.r.Y.cl.Y.w.cp.Y Σ+Σ=  
iii2piim2w22 a.r.Y.cl.Y.w.cp.Y Σ+Σ=    ……..(23) 
aaiiaaa D.pa.Y.pp.Y +Σ=  
 
Where cwi represents the proportion of the nominal wage income spent on 
consumption commodity i; cpi, the proportion of nominal profit income spent on 
consumption commodity i; and Da represents autonomous demand for the circulating 
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capital good. It is assumed that all wages are spent no consumption and part of profit 
income is saved so that  
 
1cc 2w1w =+    and c2p1p s1cc −=+    ……..(24) 
 
where sc is the saving propensity of capitalists. We further suppose that  
 
ε.cc 1w2w =    and χ.cc 1p2p =     ……..(25) 
 
so that  
ε
ε
ε +=+= 1c   , 1
1c 2w1w   and 
( )
χ
χ
χ +
−=+
−=
1
.s1c    ,
1
s1c c2pc1p    
        ……..(26). 
 
After some substitutions and manipulation, and bearing in mind that the profit rate r in 
each sector is simply net profit as a proportion of the value of circulating capital used 
in production, equations (23)-(26) allow one to express the gross output of each 
commodity as a multiple of the autonomous demand for the circulating capital good 
where the income-expenditure multipliers for each commodity are a function of 
technology, prices, distribution and the coefficients ε and χ. In turn, expressing prices 
in terms of the money wage, the gross output for each commodity could be more 
compactly expressed as  
 
( )kkkwpjwjiiaii l,a,p,c,c m mD.mY ==         where ,   i = 1, 2, 3; j = 1,2 ; k = 1, 2, 3 
……..(23a) 
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where the mi  represent the income-expenditure multipliers.16 
 
For the sake of the present discussion, our interest is primarily in how the income-
expenditure multipliers, mi, vary with the degree of competition, and specifically, 
given our interpretation of restricted competition, with barriers to capital mobility 
which entail a persistently higher average profit rate and/or persistent profit rate 
differentials.  
 
Equations (5) allow one to express prices relative to the money wage in terms of 
technical conditions and the rate of profit. Suppose, following Pivetti (1985), that the 
rate of profit in turn can be decomposed into a rate of interest, effectively governed by 
monetary policy, plus a margin. In the absence of restrictions on mobility of capital – 
i.e. unrestricted competition – and ignoring risk, we suppose that the excess of the 
profit rate over the rate of interest would be uniform across sectors and at its 
minimum. Restricted competition on the other hand would entail that some of these 
margins are above the minimum.  
 
More formally, define the rate of profit for sector j as 
 
jj ir τ+=        ……..(26) 
 
and, further, suppose for simplicity that the rate of profit for the processes producing 
the two consumer goods are equal and given by  
 
aca1 .ir ττ+=    and  aca2 .ir ττ+=    ……..(27) 
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 where τa is the excess of the profit rate in the circulating capital good industry over 
the interest rate, such that  
 
aa ir τ+=        ……..(28) 
 
In view of equations (27) and (28), equations (5) can be re-written in terms of 
technology, the interest rate, the relative profit-rate margins between consumer and 
capital good sectors and the profit rate margin in the capital good sector i.e. i, τca and 
τa. In other words, equations (5) can be written as  
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( )
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. .
. .
. . . .
.
. .
.
c1 a ca1 a
c1w c1
a ca1 a
c1 a c ca2 a
c2w c1 l
a ca2
a
aw
a a
a l 1 i
p l
1 a 1 i
a l 1 i
p l
1 a 1 i
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1 a 1 i
τ τ
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a
α τ τα τ τ
τ
+ += + − + +
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= − + +
    ……..(5a)   
 
In turn this makes it possible to eliminate relative prices from equations (23a) and to 
rewrite them in terms of τca and τa.17 That is 
 
( )kkacapjwjiiaii l,a,,,c,c mmD.mY ττ==        where ,   i = 1, 2, 3; j = 1,2 ; k = 1, 2, 3 
……..(23b) 
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Equations (23b) allow us to examine the effect of changes in the profit rates, both 
absolutely and between sectors on gross outputs and aggregate employment, in terms 
of the effects of these changes on the income and expenditure multipliers, mi. 
 
VIII Profit rates and income-expenditure multipliers 
 
(i) A given technology 
 
One can proceed by first, relating the income expenditure multipliers to the 
consumption out of income generated by a unit of gross output in each sector; and, 
secondly, establishing a connection between the latter and the size of the margin τa 
and the size of the differential τca. 
 
 We adopt here what is perhaps the more intuitive approach to the multiplier in terms 
of the impact on outputs of a change in the autonomous component of demand for the 
circulating capital good, the latter denoted as ΔDa. Assuming a lag of one-period 
between an increase income (wages and profits) and the subsequent increase in 
demand and output for consumer goods, one can write for the change in output of 
consumer good i between periods t+1 and t as  
 
/ / /.
2
ci cj a
t 1 t t t 1 ij t t 1 ia
j 1
Y Y c Y+ −
=
Δ = Δ + Δ∑ .c−       ……..(29) 
where  
.
.wi j yij pi ij
iw
c l
c c
p
= + Π       ……..(30) 
 31
and thus represents the real expenditure on consumption good i per unit of net income 
generated in the production of commodity j. cia refers analogously to the real 
expenditure on consumption good i per unit of net income generated in the production 
of the circulating capital good. 
The analogous expression for the change in output of the circulating capital good is 
 
 / / .
2
cja cj
t 1 t t 1 t
j 1 a
a
Y Y
1 a+ +=
⎛ ⎞Δ = Δ ⎜ −⎝ ⎠∑ ⎟
/ −
       ……..(31) 
where the ‘a’ coefficients are the corresponding per unit circulating capital 
requirements of equations (5a).  
 
Together, (29) and (30) imply that the change in output between periods t+1 and t can 
be expressed in matrix form as 
 
/t 1 t t t 1Y M Y+Δ = Δ       ……..(32) 
where  and /t 1 tY +Δ /t t 1Y −Δ  are column vectors representing the change in outputs of 
the three production processes (two consumption goods and one circulating capital 
good) between t+1 and t and between t and t-1 respectively and M is the 3x3 positive 
matrix  
  
. . . . . .
11 12 1a
21 22 2a
1 11 2 21 1 12 2 22 1 1a 2 2a
a a
c c c
M c c c
a c a c a c a c a c a c
1 a 1 a 1 a
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ + +⎢ ⎥− − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦a
 ……..(33) 
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The vector of initial changes in output across the three sectors in response to the 
autonomous demand increase, ΔDa, can be expressed as the column vector Y0 in turn 
given by  
.
1a
0 2a
a
c
Y c
1
1 a
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥Δ = Δ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
aD
)
 ……..(34) 
  
The overall change in outputs triggered by the change in autonomous demand can 
then be written, again in matrix form, as  
( ) 1 0Y I M Y−Δ = − Δ       ……..(35) 
where, I is the identity matrix and ΔY is the column vector of overall changes in 
output.18 Clearly the size of the “multiplier” ( 1I M −−  is unambiguously increasing 
in the components of M which are all positive.19  
What is less clear is how the components of M move with changes in the profit rate 
and thus how the multiplier is affected, for example, by higher profit rates associated 
with restricted competition. For this we consider the conditions under which the cij of 
equation (30) will be decreasing in the profit rate margin, τa, taking as given the profit 
rate relativities between sectors, i.e. taking as given the τca’s. Under such conditions, 
restricted competition would entail a reduction in the size of the income-expenditure 
multiplier, and thus, given technology, a reduction in aggregate labor employment for 
a given level and composition of autonomous demands. 
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Taking the money wage as numeraire, the coefficient cij of equation (29), can be 
alternatively expressed as 
( ). . .wi j pi jw j j aw
ij
iw
c l c p l a p
c
p
+ − −=  
In view of equations (5a), (27) and (28), prices relative to the money wage can be 
expressed in terms of technology and profit rate margins, so that 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ).
. . 1 . 1 . . .
. 1 . 1 . . 1 .
wi j a a j pi a a ca
ij
i a a i a a ca
c l a i a c l i
c
l a i a l i
τ τ τ
τ τ
− + + + += − + + + + + τ     ……..(36) 
As is demonstrated in the Appendix, for the present model, and for all i = 1, 2 and 
j = 1, 2, a, the sign of the differential ij
dc
d aτ (expressions (ii)-(iii), (viii) and (xi) of the 
Appendix) is á priori indeterminate. In other words, the direction of change in cij 
following a rise in the profit rate margin τa depends on the specifics of technology and 
on the magnitudes of the coefficients cwi and cpi.20  
The Appendix also provides a numerical example consisting of two different 
possibilities with regard to the aggregate employment impact of a rise in τa, for a 
given level of autonomous demand for the circulating capital good, Da. These two 
possibilities correspond to two different relative magnitudes for the consumption 
propensities, cpi and cwi, for a given technology. These simple examples demonstrate – 
Figures A2 (a) and (b) - that no hard and fast relationship can be supposed between a 
change in τa and the direction of the consequent change in the aggregate employment 
multiplier, even where the direction of change in the ci coefficients is the same for the 
two cases.   
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Of particular interest is the possibility that the employment multiplier falls with a rise 
in τa for a particular technique. This implies that, for a given amount of autonomous 
demand, aggregate employment falls as the profit rate rises generally across sectors. 
In other words, the possibility exists, ceteris paribus, that more restricted competition 
– to the extent that this is defined as a higher profit across sectors in general - is 
associated with lower aggregate employment, for a given level of autonomous 
demand.   
(ii) A further complication: switches in technique 
 
It should also be noted in this respect, that the impact on multipliers of a rise in the 
profit rates is further complicated where such changes alter the cost-minimizing 
technique of production. To this end, the Appendix also provides a standard choice of 
technique example, with  the dominant (cost-minimizing) technique changing with 
variation in profit rates and thus, given the rate of interest and τca, with τa. This 
example indicates the possibility – Figues A3 (a) and (b) - that over a range of values 
for τa , aggregate employment per unit of autonomous demand can fall and rise with 
τa. 
 
IX Restricted competition and “Keynesian” effects: a criticism of Mankiw 
 
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the significance of the results so far with respect to 
results from the New Keynesian literature – specifically, Mankiw, 1988 - suggesting a 
positive relation between the degree of product market imperfection and the income-
expenditure multiplier. In his analysis, a higher degree of imperfect competition is 
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identified with a larger price-cost margin, viz., the excess of price over cost as a 
proportion of price.  
 
Two points need to be made about how this result compares with those of previous 
sections. First, as has been emphasized recently by Vera (2006), this New Keynesian 
literature, including Mankiw 1988, does not distinguish different classes of consumers 
– specifically workers and capitalists; so that distributional changes would not impact 
on the aggregate propensity to consume. But once these are taken into account (even 
utilizing an “optimising” approach), a systematic positive relation between the 
multiplier and the degree of product market imperfection does not hold (Vera, pp. 
791-793).21 In this sense, the results above accord broadly with those of Vera. 
 
The second, and probably more fundamental difference relates to the fact that 
Mankiw’s analysis identifies the degree of competition with price-cost margins (price 
less cost as a percentage of unit price) rather than profit rates. However, the 
movement of price-cost margins (or mark-ups defined as price less cost as a 
percentage of cost) need not correspond exactly with the movement of profit rates; but 
in terms of analyzing the dominant and persistent forces at work in the economic 
system, profit rates rather than price-cost margins are arguably the critical variable.22 
 
To be more precise and making use of the preceding discussion, Mankiw’s price-cost 
margins, with prices expressed in terms of the money wage, can be expressed as  
 
iw
iawci
i p
r.p.a=μ   and   aaa r.a=μ    i = 1,2     ……..(31) 
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 where μi represents the price-cost margin for the consumption commodities and μa for 
the circulating capital good in the three-commodity case represented by equations (5). 
In view of the price equations (5a), one can relate the profit rate margins for each 
production process – i.e. the τ’s – to the price-cost margins of expressions (31), so 
that   
 
( )
( )iaci
aaiciiaci
ci 1.l.a
a1..l.l.a
μ
μμμτ −
−++=    
and        ……..(32) 
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a
a a
μτ =  
 
where τci is the profit-rate margin for the ith consumption good process. Clearly, 
taking the rate of interest as given,  there is an unambiguous increasing relation 
between the price-cost margin and the profit rate in the circulating capital good sector. 
Things are less clear in relation to the consumption good processes however. It is 
possible to express the differential of τci with respect to a change in its own margin 
and that of the capital good sector as  
 
( )[ ] ( )
( )2iaci
aiiciiaaiciiaci
ci 1.l.a
d.1..ld.a1..l.l.ad μ
μμμμμμμτ −
−−−++=  
……..(33) 
 
Equation (33) implies a lower bound on the size of any increase in the price-cost 
margin in the consumption good sector in order that a general rise in price-cost 
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margins - in particular, including a rise in the price-cost margin in the circulating 
capital good sector - is not accompanied by a fall in the profit rate of the consumption 
good process. This lower bound can be expressed in terms of a constraint on the size 
on the rise in μi relative to μa, such that  
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−>    ……..(34) 
 
The significance of inequality (34) is that depending on technology and the size of 
initial price-cost margins, it is conceivably possible that a general rise in price-cost 
margins - associated in Mankiw’s analysis with increasing imperfection of 
competition – is not necessarily associated with a general rise in profit rates. 
Arguably, in a more general input-output model, the complexity of production may 
allow even less room for inferences about systematic effects of changes in price-cost 
margins on profit rates, quite aside from problems with using such margins as a means 
of measuring the degree of competition. 
  
X Conclusion  
 
Reinterpreted in terms of restricted versus unrestricted competition and thus in terms 
of the extent to which capital is able to move sufficiently freely to enforce a tendency 
towards a uniform rate of profit, restrictions on competition may well lead to lower 
levels of aggregate employment, for the same level of autonomous demand. Our 
analysis show whether or not restricted competition has this effect depends inter alia 
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on relative consumption propensities between income classes and on the specifics of 
technology. 
 
In the multi-commodity, multi-technique case switches in technique mean a reduction 
in the aggregate employment or an increase in this multiplier as competition becomes 
less restrictive, at least where the extent of imperfection of competition is measured 
by the profit rate. 
 
The analysis of this paper therefore suggests that under certain conditions it is 
possible that less restrictive competition may generate higher aggregate employment.  
However, this does not entail any proposition about unfettered competition being 
associated with full labour employment. Nor therefore does it entail any proposition 
to the effect that in a world of unfettered or “unrestricted” competition there is little 
room in the long-run for demand stimulus engineered by government policy. This 
latter proposition is merely the mirror image of the full-employment proposition at the 
heart of orthodox long-run analysis. As such, the (now) conventional view that there 
is a hard and fast connection between imperfect competition and “Keynesian” effects 
is on extremely shaky ground and, as has been argued elsewhere, finds no support in a 
classical/Sraffian analysis of relative prices and distribution.  
 
Additionally, one finds it difficult to support the contention of Mankiw that changes 
in price-cost margins are associated with larger income-expenditure multipliers, not to 
mention the problem of conducting such an analysis in terms of such margins rather 
than in terms of profit rates. 
 
 39
Finally, the usefulness of the orthodox procedure of assuming product differentiation 
as a significant feature of imperfect competition is questionable. From a Sraffian 
perspective, arguably little is added to the analysis other than extra non-basic 
commodities, with no definite “welfare” implications forthcoming independently of 
specific assumptions about production techniques. Indeed the discussion above raises 
the possibility that net product per worker effects associated with product 
differentiation may work in the opposite direction to the effects of changes in profit 
rates on aggregate employment resulting from changes in profit rates accompanying 
restrictions on competition. What an orthodox economist would make of the welfare 
effects of imperfect competition looked at this way is unclear. 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
 
1. ‘Short-run’ here is best defined in term of a time insufficiently long enough for prices, wages and 
interest rates to respond to quantity imbalances.  It is worth stressing then that, on this definition, the 
suggestion of a role for aggregate demand in influencing output and employment in the short-run is 
certainly nothing new: the claim of novelty by New Keynesians has to do solely with the bringing of 
‘sophisticated microfoundations’ to bear on the matter. Of course, the New Keynesians, as well as most 
macroeconomists, appear completely unaware of the fact that Keynes himself in 1936 would not have 
seen as novel any claim that aggregate demand could influence output and employment in the short-
run.  
2. The relevant arguments are canvassed in White, 2004. 
3. We ignore here inflationary triggers such as a stimulus to money wages from the aggregate demand 
increase. 
4. Thus, the approach adopted here leaves no room for assumptions to the effect that “N firms … can 
produce N distinct differentiated commodities under the same cost conditions” (Hart, 1985 p.530). 
Needless to say, the approach adopted here also assumes that even generating the perception in 
consumers’ minds of product differentiation requires some difference in the combination of inputs into 
production.  
5. In other words, in this case product differentiation in the consumer good industry reflects the use of 
different capital goods and not just different combinations of labour and the same capital good. 
Different capital goods would here mean that the processes producing the capital goods are different , 
in that the combinations of labour and circulating capital used to produce the capital goods are 
different. 
6. This implicitly also rules out the use of two different circulating capital goods used exclusively as 
substitute circulating capital input in the production of circulating capital since this would imply two 
different circulating capital goods. 
7. One special case which arises here is where αl and αc, are both positive and different from unity but 
equal. This is taken up below (see footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.). 
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8. Admittedly, the presence of product differentiation could lead to a rise in price of commodity 1 in a 
short-period setting, to the extent that competition generates marketing costs for example. But 
conceivably, over time the price of commodity 1 must return to its free competition level. 
9. Indeed, one might suggest that this is a part of the evolution of price systems: viz., a learning process 
involving the realization in some cases that the ability of producers to differentiate their output was not 
dependent on a particular variety of a “basic” input. Hence some of the differentiation of “basics” 
would transform itself into a choice of technique and with it the disappearance of differentiation of 
such commodities. 
10. Of course, the other possibility – much less plausible - is that c1 c2
c1 c2
a a
l l
= so that, if, in attempting to 
differentiate their commodity (to consumers), producers of one of the versions of the consumer good 
use different amounts of one input per unit of output (compared with producers of the other consumer 
good), they will use different amounts of all inputs per unit of output, and the change in input usage 
compared with the production of the competitor product will be exactly the same for all inputs. In such 
a case, we would observe the co-existence of two techniques so long as there exists a demand for the 
two different commodities produced by means of two different circulating capital goods – so that one 
technique is not eliminated on the grounds of cost-minimization. We are assuming here of course that 
the process of differentiating one’s output from that of a competitor requires some additional quantities 
of labour and/or circulating capital. 
11. An assumption Sraffa clearly makes himself (1960, p. 8). 
12. Indeed, in a stationary economy, with a constant population, given technology and imposing the 
condition that output be equal to demand, net output per worker and consumption per head should 
move together. 
13. An alternative and more complex derivation of the same result involves identifying first the 
activity levels and associated labour employment levels for the vertically integrated consumption good 
industry for each of the two consumer goods. Thus, gross output for the circulating capital good, in the 
absence of product differentiation, is given by  
.c1a
a
aY
1 a
= − 1Y        ……..(i) 
so that the total labour requirement for the vertically integrated consumption good industry is  
.c11 c1 a
a
aL Y l l
1 a
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ −⎝ ⎠⎟
      ……..(ii) 
Hence the net output per worker in the undifferentiated product case, which will be equal to the 
maximum real wage (i.e. the reciprocal of the RHS of the equation for pc1w in equations (5) where r = 
0), is given by  
( ). .a1 w a c1 c1 a
1 aY NP
L 1 a l a
⎛ ⎞−= = ⎜⎜ − +⎝ ⎠l ⎟⎟
     ……..(iii) 
The activity level in the capital good industry with a differentiated consumer good (but homogeneous 
circulating capital good) would be given by  
. .c1 1 c2 2
a
a
a Y a YY
1 a
+= −       ……..(iv) 
and thus, in view of equations (16),  
( )
( )
. . . .
.
1 c2 2w c1 1w 21
a
a 21 c1
NP a c a c p
Y
1 a p l
⎛ ⎞+= ⎜⎜ −⎝ ⎠⎟⎟
     ……..(v) 
The total labour requirement for the vertically integrated consumption industry is therefore 
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( )
( )
. . . .. .. . .
. .
1 c2 2w c1 1w 211 2w c2
1 1w c1 a
21 a 21 c1
NP a c a c pNP c lL NP c l l
p 1 a p l
⎛ ⎞+= + + ⎜⎜ −⎝ ⎠⎟⎟
 ……..(vi) 
so that net output per worker for the differentiated product case is  
( )
( ) ( )( )
.
. . . . . . . .
a 21A
1w
c2 2w a a 2w c2 1w c1 a a c1 21
1 a p
NP
a c l 1 a c l c a l 1 a l p
−= − − + + −  
……..(vii) 
In view of equations (13) and (15) it is possible to rewrite equation (vii) as  
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
. .
. . . . . .
1
a w 21A
1w 1
1w c2 a a c2 w a 1w 21
1 a NP p
NP
1 c a l 1 a l NP 1 a c p
−= − + − + −  ……..(viii) 
In turn, in view of equations (10) and (13), expression (viii) can be written as equation (16). 
 
14. This result is not surprising since the proportions in which the two consumption goods are 
demanded and thus produced would not influence prices with constant returns to scale and an 
exogenously determined rate of profit (the so-called non-substitution theorem) – a standard feature of 
Sraffian models. It is worth noting also that we are assuming that c1w and c2w are largely independent of 
p21 and there is some precedence for this even in the orthodox literature – e.g. see the argument in Hart 
(1985), p. 540. 
15. In other words, the technique generating the highest real wage at the given rate of profit will do so 
regardless of the commodity in terms of which the real wage is expressed. 
16. Note that these multipliers would be different from the traditional textbook income-expenditure 
multipliers in a number of ways – but one worth noting here is that the multipliers here include the 
circulating capital input required in production in each sector, what have elsewhere been referred to as 
“supermultipliers”.  
17. Cf. the Appendix. 
18. The square matrix ( ) 1I M −− is a convergent power series provided that the maximum eigenvalue of 
the matrix M is in modulus less than unity (Pasinetti, 1977, p.66-67). 
19. Since the cij are all positive as are the ‘a’ coefficients, and given also the viability requirement that 
1 - aa > 0 
20. This is not really surprising given that, with the size of the profit rate differential between sectors, 
determined by τca, taken as given, along with technology, a rise in τa and thus a rise in the rate of profit 
across the board would generate a fall in the real wage, measured in term of any of the commodities or 
combination of those commodities. 
21. More precisely, Vera’s analysis, following Mankiw’s, is concerned with the fiscal multiplier and 
inter alia with its change in response to a changes in the degree of product market imperfection either 
measured in terms of price –cost margins or as mark-ups over variable cost. Vera’s result is stronger 
than stated in the text – namely that the relation between the fiscal multiplier and the size of the mark-
up is unambiguously negative (p. 789 and p. 793). 
22. The approach adopted here is therefore also different from Vera’s which focuses on mark-ups. Vera 
is however cognizant of the fact that conducting the analysis in terms of mark-ups thereby focuses the 
analysis on the short-run which is clearly Vera’s intention (e.g. the comment on p.791). 
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Appendix 
 
Impact of changes in τa on ci coefficients 
The purpose of this appendix is to determine the sign of the differentials ij
a
dc
dτ , 
ii
a
dc
dτ and  
ia
a
dc
dτ . Considering first the coefficient cij, where i ≠  j,  
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ).
. . 1 . 1 . . .
. 1 . 1 . . 1 .
wi j a a j pi a a ca
ij
i a a i a a ca
c l a i a c l i
c
l a i a l i
τ τ τ
τ τ
− + + + += − + + + + + τ        ……..( A.1) 
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the sign of the differential ij
a
dc
dτ  turns on whether  
( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 1 0
j pi i a i i wi j ca
a i wi j j pi i i wi j ca
a c a l l a c l
a a c l a c l a c l i i
τ
τ
+ −
− + − + − >    ……..( A.2) 
After some manipulation this condition can be written as  
( ) ( ). . . 1 . . . 1wiwi pi i j a a ca a i j
c Z
c c Z a l a a i a a l iτ>− + − − − +    ……..( A.3) 
 
where  
( )( ). . . . . . 1 . .a j j j i a i a a caZ a a i l a a l l a a i τ= + + − −     ……..( A.4) 
 
Since the maximum rate of profit for the price system (5a) is equal to 1 a
a
a
a
− and the 
rate of for the circulating capital good sector is r = i + τa, the maximum τa must be 
equal to 1 a a
a
a a i
a
− − .
)
. A positive maximum τa therefore requires that 1 . 
Thus Z in expression is positive and the expression 
 in the denominator must be negative.  
. 0a aa a i− − >
( ) (. . . 1 . . . 1i j a a ca a i ja l a a i a a l iτ− − − +
Provided also that  
( ) ( ). . . 1 . . . 1i j a a ca a i jZ a l a a i a a l iτ> − − − +     ……..( A.5) 
the denominator of the RHS of inequality (A.3) will be positive, though less than Z so 
the whole expression on the RHS > 1.  
 With the LHS of the inequality >1 also, it cannot be determined a priori whether the 
inequality holds. 
Condition (iv) implies a bound on the size of the differential τca relative to 
technology, namely,  
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( )( )
( ) ( )( )
. . . 1 . .
. . . . 1 . . . 1 .
a i j j i
ca
i j a j i a a i j a a
a a l i a i l
a a l a l a a i a l a a i
τ + −> + − − − − −   ……..( A.6) 
For the case where i = j , the sign of the differential ii
a
dc
dτ is similarly a priori 
unpredictable and depends on the particulars of technology, the coefficients cwi and cpi 
along with the profit rate margin differential τca. For this case, the analogous 
expression to that of A.1 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ).
. . 1 . 1 . . .
. 1 . 1 . . 1 .
wi i a a i pi a a ca
ii
i a a i a a ca
c l a i a c l i
c
l a i a l i
τ τ τ
τ τ
− + + + += − + + + + + τ    ……..( A.7) 
In order that the differential ii
a
dc
dτ >0 it is necessary that  
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
. . . .
. .. 1 . 1 . . 1
i pi a pi wi i ca
a i wi ca pi ca
a c l c c l
a l c i c i i
τ
τ τ
+ −
+ + − + − + 0>
   ……..( A.8) 
and in turn that  
( )( )( ). . . . 1 .
. . .
i a ca i ca a cawi
wi pi i a ca a i
a l l a i ic
c c a l a l
τ τ τ
τ
+ + − +>− −    ……..( A.9) 
The numerator on the RHS of the above inequality is positive since 1 . 
Provided that 
. 0a aa a i− − >
.
.
a i
ca
i a
a l
a l
τ >  the denominator of the RHS is also positive and the whole 
term no the RHS is greater than unity, as is the LHS. Hence, a priori, the sign of the 
differential is ambiguous. 
Finally, with regard to the coefficient cia, given by  
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
. . . 1 . 1 . .
. 1 . 1 . . 1 .
a wi i a a a pi a
ia
i a a i a a ca
l c l a i a c i
c
l a i a l i
τ τ
τ τ
− + + + += − + + + + + τ    ……..( A.10) 
The positivity of the differential ia
a
dc
dτ  requires that   
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )2
. . . . . 1 . 1 . 1 .
. . . . . 0
a pi i a i wi ca pi ca
a pi i i wi a ca
a c l a l c i c i i
a c l a c l
τ τ
τ
+ + − + + −
− − >
  ……..( A.11) 
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which requires in turn that 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
. . . 1 . . 1 .
1 . . . .
a i a ca i a cawi
wi pi a a i i a ca
a a l i i l ac
c c a a l a l
τ τ
τ
+ − + −>− − −    ……..( A.12) 
As with the differentials ij
a
dc
dτ and 
ii
a
dc
dτ , the sign of 
ia
a
dc
dτ is clearly ambiguous á priori. 
Impact of changes in τa on output and employment multipliers 
Figure A.2 illustrates the changes in ci coefficients, mai coefficients (the last row of the 
M matrix in expression (33)) and in the associated output and employment multipliers 
as τa changes, for the three-commodity model of Section III for a given technology. 
Panels (a) and (b) show these changes for two different sets of values of the 
consumption coefficients. 
Figure A.2(a): Impact of changes in τa for a single technique  
a c1 α c a c2 a a l c1 α l l c2 l a
0.0465 1.1 0.07 0.765 0.22 0.9 0.198 0.235  
(cw1 = cw2 = 0.45; cp1 = cp2 = 0.4) 
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 Figure A.2 (b): Impact of changes in τa for a single technique 
(cw1 = cw2 = 0.45; cp1 = cp2 = 0.2) 
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Figure A.3: (a) Multiple techniques – real wage-rate of profit relations 
Technique 
α β δ γ θ
ac1 0.0465 0.0465 0.0465 0.0465 0.07
αc 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
ac2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04
aa 0.765 0.725 0.8 0.835 0.885
lc1 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
αl 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
lc2 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198
la 0.235 0.365 0.165 0.115 0.065  
Real wage - rate of profit
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 Figure A.3: (b) Multiple techniques – impact of changes in τa on output and 
employment multipliers (cw1 = cw2 = 0.45; cp1 = cp2 = 0.4) 
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